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In order to encourage substitution of fossil fuels by cleaner renewables,
regulatory agencies have generally chosen between two types of renewable
energy standards. They have either mandated a minimum volume of renew-
able energy as in the case of ethanol in transport fuels, and for electricity in
Texas and Iowa. Or they have specified a minimum blend (share) of renew-
ables in the energy supply mix as in California, Michigan and many other
states. This paper uses a simple model to compare the dynamic effects of
these two policies. We show that a volume mandate leads to a lower energy
price, induces a greater subsidy on clean energy and a smaller fossil fuel tax
than the blend mandate. The volume mandate also leads to larger cumu-
lative renewable energy use over the time horizon. We illustrate the model
with plausible parameter values and show that the two energy mandates
lead to large differences in fossil fuel taxes and clean energy subsidies.
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1 Introduction
In order to promote clean energy and reduce fossil fuel use, many governments
have implemented regulation that prescribes a minimal use of renewable energy
in sectors such as transport and power generation. These Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS) come in two forms – as volume or blend mandates. The volume
mandate specifies a minimum volume of renewable energy that must be produced
each period (e.g., annually) and the blend mandate sets a minimum share of
renewables in the total supply of energy that must be met each period. Figure
1 shows a map of the two types of standards in operation for power generation
in various US states. Most states have implemented a blend mandate but Texas
and Iowa have volume mandates. For biofuels, under the Energy Policy Act of
2005, the US EPA has a volume mandate – it requires that transport fuels must
contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel such as ethanol (36 billion gallons
by 2022).1 On the other hand, the European Union has a blend mandate that
prescribes a minimum 10 percent share of biofuels in transport.2
The objective of both types of mandates is to accelerate the transition from
polluting fossil fuels such as oil and coal to cleaner renewable forms of energy.
Apart from its contribution to climate policy (through lower carbon emissions
per unit of energy), another stated motive for implementing these standards is to
ensure the security of energy supply since the policy may encourage indigenous
production of energy from land and other sources which substitute for fossil fuel
imports (Brown and Huntington, 2010, Boeters and Koornneef, 2011).
These mandates have sharply different impacts on energy prices and the energy
mix of dirty and clean fuels, as well as the time path of carbon taxes and subsidies.
The goal of this paper is to compare these two mandates in a simple, dynamic
framework.
We compare the two mandates in a setting where carbon emissions are pro-
duced by a single fossil fuel (e.g., coal) and there is a perfectly substitutable clean




which prescribes a cumulative volume of carbon that can be emitted to ensure that
we do not cross an exogenously imposed atmospheric threshold such as a 2 degree
Celsius rise in temperature (as in Fischer and Salant, 2017). In our framework
this carbon budget can be achieved in three different ways: by (a) implementing a
carbon tax without specifying any mandate on renewable energy3 (b) prescribing
a minimum volume of renewable energy that must be used every time period (a
volume mandate) or (c) specifying a minimum share of renewables in the energy
mix (a blend mandate).
Our main results are as follows. The blend mandate leads to a higher energy
price and lower energy consumption than a volume mandate, other things being
equal. Both lead to the same carbon tax, but the blend mandate induces a lower
subsidy on clean energy and a higher tax on the fossil fuel. The blend mandate
also skews fossil fuel consumption towards the future, relative to the volume man-
date and pushes solar use more towards the present. However cumulative use of
solar energy over the entire planning horizon is always higher under the volume
mandate.
How large might the differences in the effects of the two mandates be? We
illustrate these results with a calibration exercise for the world electricity sec-
tor, using realistic parameter values, which suggests that the two mandates may
have significantly different effects on energy consumption and welfare. The blend
mandate leads to a 17% higher tax on the fossil fuel, coal. However the volume
mandate leads to a 42% higher subsidy on the clean energy. Tax revenues are
larger under the blend mandate by about 18% and subsidy payouts lower by 38%.
That is, the fiscal burden of the volume mandate is greater for the government.
There is a sizable literature that examines the economic effects of renewable
energy mandates. Most studies analyze these mandates in a static framework.
The distributional impacts of renewable energy prices in terms of pass through to
consumers has been studied by Borenstein and Davis (2016) and Reguant (2019).
de Gorter and Just (2009) and Holland et al. (2009) discuss the environmental
impacts of renewable fuel standards and find that these energy policies can often
lead to an increase in carbon emissions. The general equilibrium effects of these
3We explore this case mainly to provide a benchmark that facilitates comparison with the
two types of mandates.
3
clean energy standards through their interaction with the tax system has been
examined by Goulder et al (2016). The static effects of renewable energy mandates
on energy market prices and social welfare are addressed by Fisher (2010) and
Lapan and Moschini (2011).4 Other studies use second-best models to investigate
the economic rationale for using renewable energy subsidies or standards when
the environmental externality is already internalized by a carbon tax (Eichner
and Runkel, 2014, Fisher and Preonas, 2010, and Galinato and Yoder, 2011).
The dynamics of energy policies have been studied by Greaker et al. (2014) who
conclude that biofuel subsidies can speed up oil extraction and increase emissions.
Using a calibrated model, Fischer and Newell (2008) compare the effectiveness of
different policies for reducing carbon emissions such as emission quotas, fossil fuel
taxes, mandates, and R&D subsidies. However, none of these studies focus on
directly comparing the two types of mandates, especially their effect on energy
prices, quantities and taxes, as well as welfare.
An interesting feature of the two types of mandates is that the volume mandate
is an absolute mandate on the consumption of renewable energy, while the blend
mandate is a share, hence links the use of the renewable to the use of the fossil
fuel. This interdependency has efficiency implications for our analysis. Both
mandates lead to the imposition of a carbon tax. However, the volume mandate
only prescribes a subsidy on the clean fuel, while the blend mandate not only
subsidizes the clean fuel but imposes an additional tax on the fossil fuel as well.
Using an additional unit of the fossil fuel leads to increased use of the clean energy
under the blend mandate, hence the fossil fuel must be taxed a second time. This
leads to a higher total tax on the fossil fuel under the blend mandate.
From a policy point of view, these results suggest that the two types of man-
dates may lead to different second-best outcomes. The blend mandate increases
energy prices but leads to a lower subsidy on clean fuels. The total tax on oil
is higher as well. If the policy maker cares about learning by doing effects of
renewable energy use, the volume mandate may be preferred because it leads
to increased cumulative adoption of the renewable which could induce increased
4Specifically, Fisher shows that mandates can reduce energy prices depending upon the elas-
ticity of energy supply from renewables relative to nonrenewables as well as the stringency of
the mandate. Lapan and Moschini show that mandates dominate fuel subsidies from a welfare
perspective.
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learning and a faster transition to renewables. Government revenue is highest
when there is no mandate because the government collects carbon taxes and does
not provide any subsidy. Tax collections are lowest under a volume mandate,
because larger volumes of the clean energy must be subsidized. The volume man-
date, like the one on ethanol in the US, will generate a larger consumer surplus
due to a low energy price and a higher subsidy. Taxes on the fossil fuel are lower
so the fossil fuel industry benefits more under the volume mandate.
Section 2 presents the dynamic model. In section 3, we develop the main
analytical results, first without any mandate which helps provide an useful bench-
mark, and then with the two types of mandates. In section 4, we compare the
two mandates in the perfect competition case and, in section 5, we show how our
results are affected when the fossil fuel is supplied by a regulated monopoly. The
models are illustrated in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a simple model of energy use with two perfectly substitutable sources
of energy: a polluting fossil resource (say, coal) and a clean fuel available in
abundant supply (assume that it is solar energy). Let the consumption of coal
and solar energy at any time t be given by x(t) and y(t), respectively, and the total
energy consumed be donated by q(t) = x(t)+y(t). The surplus u(q) obtained from
energy consumption is assumed to be increasing and concave.5 Let p(q) = u′(q)
be the price of energy. Its inverse is the usual downward-sloping demand function
q(p).
Coal is available in abundance but burning it leads to carbon emissions.6 The
unit cost of coal is assumed to be a constant c > 0. Without loss of generality,
we normalize emissions so that burning one unit of coal produces exactly one unit
5In order to simplify notation, we will hide the time subscript whenever convenient and it is
clear from the context.
6Introducing scarce fossil fuel resources will not change our results, as long as the initial
reserves are higher than the maximum cumulative extraction allowed. Most studies such as the
successive IPCC Assessment Reports suggest that known reserves far exceed the quantity that
can be used before catastrophic climate damages kick in, see Heede and Oreskes (2016).
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of pollution. Let Z(t) be the cumulative carbon emissions at time t. We set the
initial stock of emissions to zero for simplicity. We then have
Ż(t) = x(t), Z(0) = 0 (1)
where Ż(t) is the time derivative of Z(t). We impose a carbon budget, i.e., a
limit on the aggregate stock of carbon emissions which can not be exceeded at
any time. This carbon budget may be considered an upper bound on the stock of
pollution beyond which damages are expected to be catastrophic. Let Z̄ denote
this cap on the stock of carbon, giving us the following inequality constraint
Z̄ − Z(t) ≥ 0 . (2)
If the carbon budget is completely exhausted at some time T , i.e., Z(T ) = Z̄,
then we can not burn any more coal beyond this time, so energy demand must be
met by the clean alternative – which is solar energy with unit cost given by k, also
assumed constant. The cost of solar is taken to be higher than that of coal, i.e.
k > c.7 If only solar energy is used at any time, the price of energy must equal
its unit cost, k. Let ŷ be the solar consumption at this price, i.e., u′(ŷ) = k.
Defining the two types of energy mandate
We define a volume mandate set by the regulator as a minimum volume of solar
energy y > 0 that must be consumed at each point in time, i.e.,
y(t)− y ≥ 0 . (3)
When the carbon budget is completely exhausted in our model, coal can not be
used any more, so all energy must be supplied by solar, given by ŷ. In order
for the mandate to bind before coal is completely exhausted, we assume that the
volume mandate prescribes a lower level of solar energy consumption than ŷ, i.e.
y < ŷ.
7Even though solar energy costs for electricity are declining rapidly in sectors such as trans-
portation, solar may actually be more expensive, for example, given the relatively high cost of
electric vehicles or the cost of reliable back-up generation or storage when the sun does not
shine. Of course, with existing subsidies, solar costs often compare favorably with fossil alter-
natives. But studies generally suggest that solar energy in the form of photovoltaic cells may be
significantly more expensive than fossil fuels even when externality costs are accounted for (see
e.g., Borenstein 2012).
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On the other hand, the blend mandate specifies that the share of clean energy
in the energy mix must have a lower bound, defined as σ, with 0 < σ < 1. This
generates the inequality y ≥ σ(x + y) that must bind each time period. We can
simplify this expression by defining θ = σ/(1− σ), the ratio of energy generation
from renewables to nonrenewables, so that the blend mandate can be re-written
as:
y(t)− θx(t) ≥ 0 . (4)
Let r > 0 be the discount rate. The social planner chooses consumption of
the fossil fuel and clean energy to maximize the sum of the discounted net surplus






[u (x+ y)− cx− ky] e−rtdt , (5)
subject to the carbon ceiling constraints (1) and (2), and either (3) or (4), depend-
ing on which mandate is being considered.8 Let λ be the shadow cost of the stock
of pollution attached to condition (1), η the multiplier on the carbon budget given
by (2) and µ the multiplier for the volume mandate (3) or the blend mandate (4),
which will be clear from the context. Since coal is cheaper than solar, the former
must be used until the carbon budget is exhausted. Thus there is a time T when
the stock of pollution reaches the atmospheric limit Z̄, beyond which no coal is
used, and solar supplies all of the energy consumed.
3 Energy prices and quantities under the two
mandates
The model with no mandate
Before investigating the model with the volume and blend mandates, it is useful
to make note of the solution of the benchmark case when there is only a cap
on cumulative carbon emissions but no mandate. That is, we solve problem (5)
subject to constraints (1) and (2). The Hamiltonian can be written as
H = u(x+ y)− cx− ky − λx+ η(Z̄ − Z)
8Note that the two mandate constraints and the assumption on marginal utility together
imply that there must be some solar use at all times, y(t) > 0.
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giving us the following necessary conditions:
p ≤ c+ λ (= if x > 0) (6)
p ≤ k (= if y > 0) (7)
λ̇ = rλ− η (η = 0 if Z̄ − Z > 0) , (8)
together with the usual transversality condition limt→∞ λ(t)e−rtZ(t) = 0. Note
that λ(t) = λ0ert for t < T , where λ0 ≡ λ(0) and λ(t) may be discontinuous at
the instant when the carbon budget is reached at time T .
It is easy to interpret the above conditions. Equation (6) suggests that when
coal is used, its price must equal its unit cost plus a shadow marginal cost of the
externality given by λ. This externality cost is induced by the fact that burning
one unit of coal emits one unit of pollution, thus reducing the available carbon
budget by an equal amount. This cost rises exponentially at the rate of discount
r, as seen from (8).9 It can be interpreted as the carbon tax required to implement
the optimal solution in a market economy. Condition (7) suggests that the price of
the renewable must equal its unit cost. In the absence of any minimal requirement
of solar energy, the energy demand is initially only supplied by coal and, starting
from a level lower than the unit cost of solar k, the energy price increases over
time as shown in Figure 2 (top panel). When it reaches the trigger price k at
transition time T , solar energy becomes competitive and it entirely substitutes
for coal (bottom panel).10
Energy use and prices under the volume mandate
Under the volume mandate, we solve problem (5) with the constraints (1), (2)
and (3). We can write the Hamiltonian as:
H = u(x+ y)− cx− ky − λx+ η(Z̄ − Z) + µ(y − y),
9Note that η = 0 except when the constraint (2) binds.
10Two conditions must be satisfied at time T : the energy price must equal the unit cost of
solar and the carbon budget must be exhausted. These can be written as:





q(c+ λ0ert)dt = Z̄ . (10)
The variables λ0 and T solve this system of two equations.
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and, for x > 0, the necessary conditions as:
p = c+ λ (11)
p = k − µ (12)
λ̇ = rλ− η . (13)
Compared to the no-mandate case, only (7) changes to (12). Now, the price of the
renewable must equal its unit cost net of the shadow marginal cost of the mandate.
In a perfectly competitive economy, the optimal path can be implemented by
using two instruments: a carbon tax of λ per unit of coal that ensures that the
carbon budget is respected and a subsidy µ to solar energy induced by the volume
mandate, which pays for the gap between the energy price and the solar cost k
until solar becomes competitive, i.e. µ = k − (c+ λ).11
Figure 3 shows prices (top panel) and quantities (bottom panel) under the
volume mandate. Energy prices rise over time, because of the shadow cost of
carbon emissions, which increases over time. As previously, the price of coal is
given by the sum of the marginal cost of coal plus the externality cost. However,
since the mandate forces some use of solar y at each time, and the price of coal
and solar must be equal since they are perfect substitutes, there is a subsidy to
solar energy µ as shown in the top panel. The subsidy equals the gap between the
unit cost of solar and the social marginal cost of coal. It shrinks over time as the
stock of carbon approaches the maximum level allowed. At time T , the carbon
budget is exhausted and beyond this time, no more coal is used. The carbon tax
jumps down to zero and solar energy becomes competitive without the subsidy.
Until time T , solar use is constant and equal to the mandated level y while coal
consumption declines over time, as shown in the bottom panel. At time T , the
use of solar jumps up to ŷ to satisfy demand at the price k and coal consumption
jumps down to zero.12
11A technical appendix available with the authors provides underlying details for this model.
12As before, λ0 and T must satisfy the two conditions: the two prices must be equal at time
T and the carbon budget must be exhausted:





q(c+ λ0ert)dt− yT = Z̄ . (15)
Compared to the case with only a carbon budget and no mandate, the time at which the
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Energy use and prices under the blend mandate
With the blend mandate given by (4), the Hamiltonian is written as:
H = u(x+ y)− cx− ky − λx+ η(Z̄ − Z) + µ(y − θx),
which yields the necessary conditions:
p = c+ λ+ θµ (16)
p = k − µ (17)
λ̇ = rλ− η . (18)
Compared to the volume mandate, the only difference here is condition (16).
Coal consumption in this case is explicitly tied to the production of solar energy
because the mandate prescribes a minimum share of the renewable. The social
marginal cost of coal now includes an additional term, θµ which depends on the
shadow cost of the mandate, given by µ. For every additional unit of coal used, the
mandate requires the use of an extra θ units of the renewable, which is subsidized
at the rate µ so the additional cost is θµ.
Figure 4 shows energy use and prices under the blend mandate. In the bottom
panel, note that because coal use must decline as the cost of burning coal increases
over time due to a tighter carbon budget, solar use must also decrease in tandem.
The shape of the price path is similar to the previous case with a volume mandate.
However, since the price of the two resources must be equal, as both are being
used concurrently, we can substitute for µ from (16) and (17), which yields:
p = σk + (1− σ)(c+ λ). (19)
That is, the price of energy can be written as the weighted sum of the social
marginal cost of the two resources, where the weights are the shares of the re-
sources in the energy mix, given respectively by x = (1− σ)q and y = σq.
We still need to tax coal at the rate λ, as in the volume mandate. However,
there is an additional surcharge on coal, given by θµ. Unlike in the volume
mandate where the quantity of solar energy is fixed, here the use of solar energy
complete energy transition occurs is delayed and the carbon tax is lower. This can be checked
by comparing (9)-(10) with (14)-(15).
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is explicitly tied to how much coal we use, hence there is an additional tax on
coal. The positive term θµ can thus be interpreted as the penalty for burning an
additional unit of coal. As in the volume mandate case, the pollution tax increases
over time, but this latter penalty decreases over time because the subsidy to solar
decreases. Hence the total tax on coal given by τ is equal to λ + θµ. Applying
(16) and (19) we obtain:
τ = (1− σ)λ+ σ(k − c). (20)
The total tax on coal is the weighted sum of the additional unit cost (k − c) of
using solar energy at the mandated level and the carbon tax, the weights being
the share of the two sources in each unit of energy. As shown in the top panel of
Figure 4, this tax τ increases over time (since it equals p − c) because the rising
carbon tax more than compensates for the decline in the cost of the mandate.
The subsidy on solar can be seen from (17) as k − p which upon substitution
from (19) yields µ = (1 − σ)(k − c − λ). It is the extra cost of using one unit of
solar energy instead of one unit of coal (net of the coal penalty) times the share
of coal in the energy mix. Note that, as θ = σ/(1 − σ), the total solar subsidy
payment at any time, i.e. the unit subsidy µ times the solar quantity σq is exactly
compensated by the total coal surcharge, i.e. the unit additional tax on coal θµ
times the coal quantity (1 − σ)q. That is, this tax and subsidy mechanism is
revenue-neutral for the policy-maker.
Finally, after time T , as under a volume mandate, the price equals k and
energy is exclusively supplied by solar energy.13
Effect of a smaller carbon budget and a larger solar energy
mandate
Whatever the mandate, an exogenous decrease in the carbon budget Z̄ will lead to
a higher tax on coal, which increases its price and decreases use in every period.
13As before, λ0 and T must satisfy the following two conditions:
σk + (1− σ)(c+ λ0erT ) = k ⇔ c+ λ0erT = k , (21)∫ T
0
x(t)dt = (1− σ)
∫ T
0
q[σk + (1− σ)(c+ λ0ert)]dt = Z̄. (22)
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The price path starts higher and reaches the price of the renewable earlier in
time, leading to a quicker transition time T . The subsidy to solar also declines.
Aggregate welfare also declines because of the lower volume of carbon allowed for
use.14
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of a smaller carbon budget for a volume mandate.
In the top panel, the price of coal rises, and thus leads to a shorter transition time
T . Since the volume mandate is unchanged, solar energy use does not change, but
coal use declines and less coal is used in the aggregate. Total energy use declines
as well.
Next, it is easy to see that a tightening of either of the mandates (a larger
mandated volume of the renewable or its share for the blend mandate) will lead
to coal being used over a longer period of time and a delayed transition time T .
The carbon budget also lasts for a longer time period, and so its shadow price λ
must always be lower, i.e., the carbon tax will be lower. It will take longer for
the price of coal to reach the backstop price k.
For a larger volume mandate, as the same cumulative quantity of coal must
be used up at the end (due to the carbon budget) and as the quantity of solar
energy is higher at any given time, this implies that the aggregate consumption of
energy is higher and the energy price is lower. Since the marginal cost k of solar
energy – the price at which solar energy becomes competitive – does not depend
on the mandate, the subsidy provided to the solar industry will be higher. Coal
use must decline since it is now spread over a longer time horizon. These results
are illustrated in Figure 6.
The effect of a larger blend mandate is more nuanced, because of the propor-
tional relationship between the two energy sources. The effect on energy quantity,
price, total tax on coal and subsidy to solar energy are indeterminate. We will
discuss these issues for some plausible parameter values later in the calibration
section.
14A proof is provided in the Technical Appendix.
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4 Comparing the two mandates
Defining a benchmark for comparison
Since the parameters that specify the volume and blend mandates are independent
of each other, we need a yardstick for comparing the two. For this paper, we choose
the two mandates such that under both, the carbon budget Z̄ is exhausted at the
same time T . Figure 7 illustrates this rule for a particular transition time T ∗.
Each of the two curves shows the relationship between the level of a mandate and
the transition time: tightening the mandate by increasing the volume or blend
share of the renewable (traveling away from the origin on either side) postpones
the transition to clean energy. For simplicity, the figure depicts this relationship
as linear but it can be represented by any continuous increasing function. Given
a carbon budget Z̄ and a transition time T , there is a unique value of the volume
mandate y and the blend mandate σ.15
We use the superscripts v and b to denote the values of the variables for the
volume and blend mandates, respectively. Since the total time taken to exhaust
the carbon budget is assumed to be the same across the two mandates, the shadow
prices in the two models must be equal since both must rise exponentially and
equal the price of the backstop solar at the common time T . Hence λv0 = λb0 = λ0.
That is, the carbon tax on coal is the same for both mandates. After the transition
time T , only solar supplies energy and satisfies demand at its marginal cost. We
therefore restrict the comparison to the period before time T .
Taxes and Subsidies
A comparison of the taxes and subsidies under the two mandates is best done
graphically, as shown in Figure 8. Recall that the energy price to the consumer
under the volume mandate is pv = c + λ, and for the blend mandate, it is pb =
c + λ + θµ. This yields pb(t) − pv(t) = θµ > 0. As shown in the figure, the
blend energy price is higher than the price under the volume mandate by the coal
surcharge, θµ. Both subsidies equal the respective difference between the unit cost
15There may be alternative criteria for comparison of the two mandates, such as targeting a
specific value of a welfare measure (aggregate surplus) that must be attained at transition, or
maintaining the same government revenue as in Durrmeyer and Samano (2018).
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of solar and the energy price. Thus, the subsidy to solar is lower under the blend
mandate than for the volume mandate, as shown. k = pv + sv = pb + sb which
implies that sv − sb = θµ > 0.
The same carbon tax is applied under both mandates. However, there is an
additional surcharge to coal under the blend mandate which leads to a higher tax
on coal for the blend mandate. This surcharge also drives a wedge between the
solar subsidies under the two mandates, as seen in the figure. The higher fossil
fuel tax under the blend mandate is exactly compensated by the higher subsidy
to the renewable under the volume mandate.
Energy use
A higher energy price under the blend mandate implies that aggregate energy use
is lower at each instant, and cumulative energy use is lower as well, since transition






vdt. But the total amount of coal burnt
must be equal during the interval [0, T ] since we exhaust the carbon budget in








Note that xv = qv − y and xb = (1− σ)qb, we can take time derivatives to get∣∣∣ẋb(t)∣∣∣ = (1− σ) ∣∣∣q̇b∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣q̇b∣∣∣ < |q̇v| = |ẋv|. That is, coal is extracted at a faster rate
under the volume mandate. From Figure 8, it is easy to observe that ṗv > ṗb.
Consequently, |q̇v| >
∣∣∣q̇b∣∣∣. As equal volumes of carbon must be emitted over time,
the extraction paths must cross, as shown in Figure 9. Because the blend mandate
uses lower quantities of clean energy as coal use declines over time, more coal is
extracted under this mandate later in time.
We know that under the volume mandate, solar energy use is fixed at a given
level, yv = y. Under the blend mandate, it declines over time, yb = θxb = σqb. But
as we have shown earlier, cumulative solar energy consumption is larger under the
volume mandate. Then, two things can happen. Either solar energy use is higher
at the beginning for the blend mandate but declines, such that aggregate solar
use is lower. Or solar use is lower throughout, relative to the volume mandate.




Under perfect competition, the solar and coal producers get zero profit because of
constant returns to scale. This is true for both mandates. The consumer surplus
is given by CS ≡ u(q)−qp = u(q)−qu′(q). Since at any time, consumption under
a volume mandate is higher, consumers enjoy a larger surplus with a volume
mandate than with a blend mandate.
The government revenue at ay instant GR is the total tax income net of the
subsidy payout: GR ≡ τx − sy. Comparing these revenues under each mandate
leads to ambiguous results. Since the total tax under the blend mandate is higher,
τ b > τ v and the subsidy to solar is lower, sb < sv, the government revenue per unit
of delivered energy is always higher with a blend mandate. However, as the level
of coal consumption under the blend mandate is smaller at the beginning of the
planning horizon, and higher at the end, it is not possible to say which policy yields
a larger aggregate government revenue over the planning horizon. Finally, we also
have ambiguity in the comparison of total current surplus W = u(q) − cx − ky.
The calibrated example developed in the next section will address this issue.
We now summarize the main insights from the comparison of the two man-
dates:
Proposition: For mandates with the same carbon budget Z̄ exhausted at the
same time T , the blend mandate induces: i) a higher energy price and lower
aggregate energy consumption; ii) the same carbon tax but a lower subsidy to
solar and a higher total tax on coal; iii) the same cumulative coal use but less
at the beginning and more during later periods; and iv) a lower cumulative solar
energy use.
5 Coal is supplied by a regulated monopoly
One may ask whether our results will be radically different if coal was supplied
by a monopoly which is regulated to produce at the optimal level. This regulated
monopoly would choose the quantity of coal x to maximize (u′(x + y) − c − τ)x
where τ is the tax imposed by the planner. The model is the same as before
except that the supplier is a monopoly. This yields the necessary condition
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p = u′(q) = c+ τ − xu′′(q) (23)
which suggests that the monopoly receives a subsidy equal to −xu′′(q) > 0 per
unit of coal to produce at the optimal level. The monopoly price is the sum
of the marginal extraction cost and the total tax on coal (including the carbon
tax and the coal surcharge in case of a blend mandate), net of this subsidy. At
equilibrium, this price must be equal to the marginal surplus of the consumer.
The price of energy is same as before, only the transfer to the monopoly changes.
The producer surplus PS = −x2u′′(q) is now strictly positive.
Comparing (23) with (11) for the volume mandate, and (16) for the blend
mandate (while taking into account that µ = (1 − σ)(k − c − λ)), we obtain the
unit transfers to the coal producer under the two mandates:
τ v = λ+ xvu′′(qv) with xv = qv − y , (24)
τ b = σ(k − c) + (1− σ)λ+ xbu′′(qb) with xb = (1− σ)qb . (25)
This net transfer incorporates both the distortion from market power and
the environmental externality. If the former is larger, the the monopoly receives a
positive net transfer (i.e., τ < 0), otherwise the monopolist pays a positive net tax
(i.e. τ > 0). The sign of τ is indeterminate. However, compared to a competitive
coal producer, τ is smaller for the monopolist, because the unrestricted monopoly
always produces a quantity less than the competitive market.
Consumption of coal and solar are still the same as before. The solar suppliers
still earn zero profit. The subsidy on solar remains unchanged. However the net
tax on coal changes. From (24) and (25), the difference in total coal taxes for the
volume and blend mandates is τ v−τ b = −σ(k−c−λ)+xvu′′(qv)−xbu′′(qb), whose
sign cannot be determined analytically. The difference in the surplus accruing to
the coal producer PS = −x2u′′(q) and in government revenues GR = τx− sy are
indeterminate as well.
6 Numerical illustration
In this section, we use a simple calibration model to illustrate the effect of the
two mandates on energy prices and consumption. We compare them under the
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condition that a common carbon budget must be exhausted at the same time.
Energy quantities are measured in terawatt-hour (TWh), CO2 emissions in tons
(tCO2), prices in dollars per megawatt ($/MWh), and carbon taxes in dollars per
ton of CO2 ($/tCO2). The base year is 2016 and the model is run until the year
2065.
We only model the world electricity sector and make the simple assumption
that electricity is supplied by coal and solar energy. The part of demand supplied
by hydro and other sources is taken out of the model. According to the Interna-
tional Energy Agency, electricity generation is responsible for 42% of global CO2
emissions.16 Of this, 73% can be attributed to coal-fired power plants. Thus, coal
contributes to global emissions by about 30%.
The unit delivery cost of each energy source is given by the levelized cost of
electricity (LCOE) which is the average total cost per unit of generation. They
include capital and investment costs, fuel costs, and other fixed and variable
operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. Using data from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, mean LCOE for conventional coal and solar PV are
set at c =$95/MWh and k =$130/MWh, respectively.17
We assume a quadratic utility function of the form u(q) = αq − (β/2)q2,
which yields a linear demand function q(p) = (α − p)/β, with an upper bound
on energy consumption, q < α/β. The corresponding price elasticity is given by
ε ≡ |pq′(p)/q(p)| = p/(α− p). The demand function is then calibrated as follows.
First, absent any climate and energy policy, electricity is generated only by coal
and its price equals p = c = $95. As in the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2015),
we assume that this initial state is characterized by a price elasticity of demand
equal to ε = 0.65. This yields α = p(1 + ε)/ε = 241. Parameter β is calibrated
from the initial world electricity production from coal in 2016, which according
to the International Energy Agency, equals 9,594 TWh so that β = (α− p0)/q0 =
(241− 95)/(9594× 106) = 1.52× 10−8.18
For convenience, the initial level of cumulative pollution is normalized to
zero. We use a carbon dioxide emissions factor for conventional coal of 0.32
16See https://www.ina.org/statistics/co2emissions/
17Annual Energy Outlook (2019), world markets data: http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/
18https://www.iea.org/statistics/
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tCO2/MWh.19 In the analytical model earlier, this parameter was taken as one.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates a remaining global
carbon budget of 570 GtCO2 for a 66% probability of limiting global warming to
1.5°C above the pre-industrial level, and of 1,320 GtCO2 for a 2°C rise with the
same probability.20 Here we focus on the 2°C scenario. As coal-fired electricity
generation accounts for around 30% of global emissions, we consider a sector-
specific carbon budget of 396 GtCO2.21 The social discount rate is set at 3%,
which is in the standard range 0− 5% generally used in climate economic models.
We consider the following three cases: no mandate, a "low" mandate (either
a 1,250 TWh volume mandate or a 15% blend mandate) and a "high" mandate
(either a 2,700 TWh volume mandate or a 30% blend mandate). The no mandate
case assumes the model has a carbon budget but does not specify a solar mandate.
Each of the low and high mandates (either volume or blend) are designed to satisfy
the comparison rule illustrated by Figure 7.22
Calibration results are summarized in Table 1. The results specific to the
monopoly coal sector are given in Table 2. We only discuss the high mandate
case, although the solution for both high and low mandates is shown in Table 1.
1. Note that the time to energy transition T is the same for either type of
mandate. However a larger mandate extends the use of the fossil fuel from 2043
to 2049. Without a mandate, the carbon budget (396 GtCO2) is exhausted by
2039.
19See MIT Units and Conversions Fact Sheet: http://web.mit.edu/mit_energy
20IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C: https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
21https://www.iea.org/statistics/co2emissions/




such that a common carbon budget Z̄ is exhausted at
the same time T . Introducing a carbon emission factor ζ for coal and replacing q(p) by (α−p)/β
into (15) (respectively, (22)) while using (14) and ((21)), we get: (α−c−βy)T = (k−c−ζλ0)r +
βZ̄
ζ
and [α−σk−(1−σ)c]T = (1−σ)(k−c−ζλ0)r +
βZ̄
(1−σ)ζ . As the initial shadow cost of carbon emissions
λ0 (which is equal to (k− c)e−rT in both cases) must be the same under each mandate, the two
















that meet our comparison criteria.
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2. Without a mandate, the initial carbon tax is $57/tCO2, growing at 3% per
year. The carbon tax is lower by about 25% with a high mandate ($43/tCO2).
3. Compared to a volume mandate, the blend mandate leads to a higher tax
on coal, by about 17% from $22 to $26/MWh. Solar subsidies are higher for the
volume mandate by about 42% from $8.9 to $12.7/MWh.
4. Tax revenues from the mandate policy are higher under the blend mandate
by about 18%. Subsidy payouts are lower as well by about 38%. So the govern-
ment surplus for the blend mandate is higher, by about 52%. This is because the
subsidy to the renewable is lower and the tax on the fossil fuel is higher for the
blend mandate.
5. The initial price of energy is about 6% higher under the blend mandate,
relative to the volume mandate. Note that the terminal prices must be equal since
they all equal the solar price, albeit at different times. This higher price under
the blend mandate leads to a lower consumer surplus as well.
6. Cumulative solar use is higher by about 12% under the volume mandate,
since under the blend mandate, as the price of energy goes up, the mandate
declines.
The dynamic behavior of prices is shown in Figure 10. Energy prices are
lower under the two volume mandates relative to the case with no mandates
(panel (a)). The fall in price is larger when the mandate is larger.23 However the
blend mandates skew the price distribution – larger mandates raise prices today
but lower them in the future (panel (b)). A larger blend mandate increases the
surcharge on coal (panel (c)). Finally a higher blend mandate raises the initial
solar subsidy while lowering it in the future (panel (d)).
In Figure 11 we show the dynamic effects from the volume and blend mandates
for the high case. Note how the volume mandate energy price starts lower and
approaches the blend price at the time of energy transition (panel (a)). However,
since aggregate coal use must be constant, the coal use under the volume mandate
is higher at the beginning and lower at the end (panel (b)). Solar energy use is
higher under the volume mandate throughout (panel (c)).
23The role of subsidies in lowering energy prices has been noted empirically by Liski and
Vehvilainen (2016) for the Nordic electricity market.
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Finally we show results when the producer of coal is a monopoly (see Table
2). Most results go through with the introduction of market power in the coal
marker. Producer surplus increases under the volume mandate because the tax on
coal is lower. The mean tax on coal net of the subsidy is about 26% higher, and
tax revenue accruing to the government is 28% higher under the blend mandate.
7 Concluding remarks
Two types of renewable energy mandates are commonly observed in practice – a
volume mandate that prescribes a certain volume of renewable energy use and a
blend mandate, which is a share of the total energy mix that must be sourced
from renewable energy. In this paper we compare the dynamic effects of these two
mandates, both in a simple analytical framework and through a calibration with
realistic data.
Using coal and solar energy as the dirty and clean sources of energy, we show
that the blend mandate leads to a higher price of energy, a lower subsidy to solar
and a higher tax on coal, relative to a volume mandate. The blend mandate also
leads to lower coal consumption at the beginning but higher in later time periods,
than a volume mandate. Because the blend instrument ties solar to coal use, it
also leads to a lower cumulative solar consumption than the volume mandate.
When the two types of mandates have the same goals in terms of the carbon
budget to be exhausted and the time of complete transition to renewable supply,
the blend mandate imposes a higher tax on coal and a lower subsidy to the re-
newable. It also skews coal use by pushing more of it to the future, and leads to
lower cumulative use of the renewable.
A simple calibration with realistic data shows that the differences in the two
mandates may be significant. The blend mandate leads to a 17% higher tax on
coal. On the other hand, the volume mandate induces a 42% higher subsidy on
solar. Tax revenues for the government are greater under the blend mandate by
about 18% and subsidy payouts are lower by about 38%. The blend mandate
taxes the fossil fuel more and subsidizes the renewable less, ensuring a lower fiscal
burden for the government. The price of energy is slightly higher for the blend
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mandate as well. Cumulative solar use is higher under the volume mandate since
the blend mandate is diluted over time as the energy mix uses less of the fossil
fuel due to its rising price.
In general, mandates subsidize renewable energy and reduce carbon taxes and
the price of energy. The larger the mandate the greater is the subsidy. However,
the volume mandate leads to a larger subsidy for the renewable and a lower tax
on the fossil fuel. These results have political economy implications that should
be considered in future work. For example, do jurisdictions which have stronger
fossil fuel lobbies prefer volume mandates? An important issue we do not explicitly
model is learning-by-doing, especially in newer technologies such as solar energy.
However, if the degree of learning is proportional to the size of the renewables
market, then the volume mandate may lead to larger learning effects, since unlike
the blend mandate, solar consumption does not decline over time. The mandates
differ in the distribution of the energy mix over time, with the blend mandate
pushing fossil fuel use to future time periods, and the volume mandate using
more of the polluting fuel in early periods. To the extent that the timing of carbon
emissions matters for the environment and not just the aggregate pollution, the
blend mandate may produce less damage because it postpones carbon emissions
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Figure 1: Both volume and blend mandates are in effect in the US
Renewable & Clean Energy Standards
www.dsireusa.org / June 2019
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MT: 15% x 2015
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NC: 12.5% x 2021 (IOUs)
VA: 15% 
x 2025†KS: 20% x 2020
ME: 100% x 2050
29 States + DC have a
Renewable Portfolio 
Standard, 3 states have a 
Clean Energy Standard
(8 states have renewable 
portfolio goals, 2 states have 
clean energy goals)
Renewable portfolio standard
Renewable portfolio goal Includes non-renewable alternative resources* Extra credit for solar or customer-sited renewables†
U.S. Territories
DC
TX: 5,880 MW x 2015*
SD: 10% x 2015
SC: 2% 2021
NMI: 20% x 2016
PR: 100% x 2050
Guam: 25% x 2035
USVI: 30% x 2025
NH: 25.2% x 2025
VT: 75% x 2032
MA: 35% x 2030 + 1% each 
year thereafter (new resources)
6.7% x 2020 (existing resources)
RI: 38.5% x 2035
CT: 40% x 2030
NY:50% x 2030
PA: 18% x 2021†
NJ: 50% x 2030 
DE: 25% x 2026*
MD: 50% x 2030
DC: 100% x 2032
Clean energy standard
Clean energy goal
Note: Texas and Iowa have volume mandates while many other states have blend
mandates.
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Note: The top panel shows that energy prices increase over time until they reach
the solar price. In the bottom panel, only coal is used until exhaustion at T ,
followed by solar energy. The shaded area represents the total carbon budget
that must be exhausted.
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Note: The carbon tax increases over time and the subsidy to solar decreases. Coal
use declines while solar use is fixed by the mandate.
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Note: There is a carbon tax on coal plus a surcharge because the blend mandate
induces additional solar deployment for each unit of coal used.
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Note: A smaller carbon budget leads to an increase in the energy price. Total
coal use declines and there is a quicker transition to clean energy.
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Note: Mandate y shifts up to y′. The price of energy decreases, the tax on coal
decreases and aggregate energy consumption increases. Solar use increases and
coal use must decline because it is spread over a higher time period.
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Note: We compare volume and blend mandates that use the same carbon budget
over the same time period.
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Note: The price of energy is higher under a blend mandate because of the addi-
tional surcharge on coal. The total tax on coal is also higher, and the subsidy
on solar energy is lower. The surcharge on coal for the blend mandate exactly
compensates for the additional subsidy to solar under the volume mandate.
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Figure 9: Initial coal use is higher under the volume mandate, and








Note: The blend mandate pushes coal use to future periods.
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Note: All prices are in $/MWh. Raising the volume mandate reduces the price of
energy in all periods, but raising the blend mandate increases current prices and
decreases future prices. Raising the blend mandate increases the coal surcharge
but shifts the subsidy on solar to future periods.
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2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047
c. Solar energy use
Note: The blend mandate raises energy prices, postpones coal use to the future
and uses less solar energy.
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Table 1: Model results with competitive coal supply
Model outcome variables No mandate Low mandate High mandate
Volume Blend Volume Blend
1250TWh 15% 2700TWh 30%
Time to energy transition T 2039 2043 2043 2049 2049
Initial carbon tax ($/tCO2) 57.46 51.05 51.05 42.76 42.76
Initial price of energy ($/MWh) 113.27 111.23 114.04 108.59 115.01
Mean values
over the planning horizon
Initial coal use (TWh) 8288 7156 7013 5863 5745
Final coal use (TWh) 7746 6550 6576 5176 5408
Solar energy use (TWh) 0 1250 1199 2700 2390
Cumulative solar use (TWh) 0 33750 32632 89100 79394
Subsidy to solar ($/MWh) 0 10.94 9.29 12.7 8.89
Surcharge on coal ($/MWh) 0 0 1.64 0 3.81
Total tax on coal ($/MWh) 25.35 24.06 25.71 22.30 26.11
Tax revenue (billion) 203.27 164.91 174.67 123.1 145.61
Total subsidy payment (billion) 0 13.67 11.14 34.29 21.25
Discounted aggregate surplus
Consumer surplus (billion) 12471 12860 12593 13474 12748
Government revenue (billion) 3174 2507 2769 1481 2260
Total (billion) 15645 15367 15362 14955 15008
Note: Initial coal use is the mean annual use for the first half of the planning
horizon, and final coal use is the mean for the second half. Other values are
averaged over the whole planning horizon. Aggregate surplus is discounted at 3%.
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Table 2: Coal supplied by regulated monopoly
Model outcome variables No mandate Low mandate High mandate
Volume Blend Volume Blend
1250TWh 15% 2700TWh 30%
Mean values:
Total tax on coal ($/MWh) 25.35 24.06 25.71 22.30 26.11
Subsidy to coal ($/MWh) 12.08 10.33 10.24 8.32 8.40
Net tax on coal ($/MWh) 13.28 13.74 15.47 13.98 17.71
Tax revenue (billion) 106.43 94.15 105.05 77.19 98.75
Discounted aggregate surplus:
Coal producer (billion) 1715 1405 1372 1054 1044
Government revenue (billion) 1459 1102 1398 427 1216
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Technical Appendix provided only for manuscript
review
Volume mandate
Under a volume mandate, λ0 and T must solve the following system of equations:
c+ λ0erT = k (26)∫ T
0
q(t)dt− yT = Z̄ , (27)
where q solves u′(q) = p = c + λ0ert, which implies that dq = dpu′′(q) =
ert
u′′(q)dλ0.
Taking c, k and r as given, totally differentiating (26)-(27) and expressing in




























u′′(q)dt− (ŷ − y) ,
which is negative as u′′ < 0 and ŷ > y by assumption.




∣∣∣∣∣0 11 ∫ T0 ertu′′(q)dt




∣∣∣∣∣ rλ0 0(ŷ − y) 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = rλ0∆ < 0 . (30)
From (30), we directly obtain dp/dZ̄ < 0 and dq/dZ̄ > 0. Next, given that
x = q − y and µ = k − p, we conclude that dx/dZ̄ = dq/dZ̄ > 0 and dµ/dZ̄ =
−dp/dZ̄ > 0. Denoting by V the optimal value function of the program and ap-
plying standard dynamic programming methods (under exponential discounting),
the Bellman equation writes: rV (Z) = max {u(x+ y)− cx− ky + xV ′(Z)} ∀t,
with V ′(Z) = −λ. A simple expression of V is thus given by the Hamiltonian of
the program evaluated at time t = 0:
rV = u(q0)− (c+ λ0)x0 − ky . (31)
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∣∣∣∣∣0 1T ∫ T0 ertu′′(q)dt




∣∣∣∣∣ rλ0 0(ŷ − y) T
∣∣∣∣∣ = rλ0T∆ < 0 , (33)
which suggests that dp/dy < 0, dq/dy > 0 and dµ/dy > 0. The effects of a larger
y on coal consumption and on social welfare are ambiguous and may depend in























Under a blend mandate, {λ0, T} is solution to




q(t)dt = Z̄ , (35)





































u′′(q) dt is positive as u
′′ < 0 and k > c + λ0ert for






u′′(q) dt− ŷ < 0 .
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∣∣∣∣∣ 0 11(1−σ) ∫ T0 (1−σ)ertu′′(q) dt





∣∣∣∣∣ = rλ0(1− σ)∆ < 0 . (39)
Equation (39) directly implies dp/dZ̄ < 0 and dq/dZ̄ > 0. As x = (1 − σ)q and
y = σq, we also have dx/dZ̄ > 0 and dy/dZ̄ > 0. The subsidy to solar energy is
µ = k − p = (1− σ)(k − c− λ) so that dµ/dZ̄ = −(1− σ)dλ/dZ̄ > 0. The total
tax on coal τ = λ + θµ = (1 − σ)λ + σ(k − c) and dτ/dZ̄ = (1 − σ)dλ/dZ̄ < 0.
That is, if the carbon budget increases, the consequent decrease in the carbon tax
is greater than the increase in the tax on coal from the blend mandate so that the
total tax on coal is lower. Lastly, the value function V is given by
rV = u(q0)− [(1− σ)(c+ λ0) + σk]q0 , (40)





∣∣∣∣∣0 1Λ ∫ T0 (1−σ)ertu′′(q) dt





∣∣∣∣∣ = rλ0Λ∆ < 0 . (42)
That is, the effect of a larger blend mandate σ on energy prices and quantities,
and taxes cannot be determined without specifying functional forms.
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